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SURETYSHIP AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS:
A SURVEY OF THE MINNESOTA LAWr
By STEFAN A. RiEsENFELD* AND WILLIAM E. MussmAN**

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE INQUIRY

tT HE YEAR 1677 marks a very important although probably
ITnot altogether propitious event in the history of Anglo-American law. In that year the celebrated Statute of Frauds was enacted,
mainly through the joint efforts of Lord Nothingham and Chief
Justice North together with other famous contemporary jurists
including, in all likelihood, Sir Matthew Hale.2 Hardly any lawyer
will disagree that this act'and its American counterparts have been
among the most controversial and most frequently litigated pieces
of legislation in English speaking countries.
The first treatise on the Statute known to the writers appeared
a little more than 125 years after its enactment,3 and in the preface
the author informs us that from the days of Lord Mansfield ".... a
diversity of sentiment has prevailed with respect to the utility of
the great Statute of Frauds and Perjuries." Surveying the pronouncements for and against the act he concluded that they were
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.

*Instructor of Law, University of Minnesota.
129 Car. II., chp. 3. An Act for the Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries.
2
Date and authorship of the statute were for a long time uncertain and
in dispute. The results of the most modem and convincing research can be
found in Costigan, The Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds, (1913)
26 Harv. L. Rev. 329; Flemming, The Original Drafts of the Statute of
Frauds (29 Car. II c. 3) and Their Authors, (1913) 61 U. Pa. L. Rev. 283;
and 6 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (2nd ed. 192-4) p. 379. Wrong
and misleading is Hawkins, Where, Why and When Was the Statute of
Frauds Enacted, (1920) 54 Am. L. Rev. 867.
sRoberts, Statute of Frauds (London 1805). The first American edition
appeared in 1807.
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fairly balanced. 4 But in recent days the current of opinion seems
to have swung to a condemnation of both the wisdom and beneficial effect of the statute,5 although voices of praise have not been
silenced entirely.6
While in fact most of the provisions of this once very comprehensive act have been either repealed or incorporated into other
statutes by the British Parliament in the course of time, the famous
section 4 requiring a writing for certain types of agreements,
among them contracts of guarantee, and section 23 are still in force
in the original version.8 And it is the very section 4, which was
inserted in the original draft only at a later stage,9 that has come
to be regarded as the very heart of the statute of frauds.
It is certainly significant that in the country of its origin the
English Law Revision Committee recommended in 193710 the repeal of section 411 which contains, in addition to provisions relating
to other types of contracts, the famous reference to "any special
promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another
person." With negligible differences in phraseology, it is reiterated
in all American statutes of frauds. The most interesting point for
our purpose is the fact that while the Law Revision Committee in
general was in agreement upon the advisability of the repeal of
the section there was a split with reference to contracts of guarantee.
The majority stated explicitly that they had considered the question "... whether we ought to recommend that the contract of
4
Roberts, Statute of Frauds (Phil. 1807) p. XX. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries (6th ed. 1774) p. 159 stated the provisions of the statute without

special comment.

5See the literature listed by Ireton, Should We Abolish the Statute of
Frauds?, (1938) 72 U. S. L. Rev. 195. The learned writer calls the statute
"ambiguous, archaic, arbitrary, uneven, unwieldly, unnecessary and unjust."
6
Hawkins, loc. cit. supra note 2, concludes that the statute stands as a
"lofty and endurable monument to the genius, logic and equitable abilities
of a class of law makers, whose facilities, education, environment and experience fitted them for just such a task."
71n its present form the section reads: "No action shall be brought
whereby to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise
to answer damages out of his own estate; or whereby to charge the Defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriages of another person; or to charge any person upon any agreement
made upon consideration; or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof; unless the
agreement upon which such action shall be brought or some memorandum
or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged
therewith or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."
sWilliams, The Statute of Frauds (1932) sec. 4.
Flemming, loc. cit. supra note 2.
9See
1
OLaw Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, Statute of Frauds and
Doctrine of Consideration (1937), reprinted in (1937) 15 Can. B. Rev. 585.
lThe committee follows the conclusions previously reached by the
scholarly treatise of Williams, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 280.
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guarantee should be treated separately .. .by providing that a
sighed writing should be made essential for this type of promise,"
but that they had reached a negative conclusion.'L The minority
conversely requested "... . that it should be provided that a guarantee is to be invalid unless the terms thereof (other than consideration, if any) have been embodied in a written instrument and
signed by the guarantor." 13
The majority of the committee based its position on the ground
that first and foremost the Act was a product of conditions in the
law of evidence -which have long since passed away, that it promoted frauds rather than prevented them, that the selection of
promises to be in writing was arbitrary and haphazard, that it was
out of step with normal business practice, that it was partial and
lopsided in its operation and ambiguous and ill drawn. 1 4 The
minority took its stand with respect to guarantees not because the
writing would prevent "frauds and perjuries" but for the reason
that it would give ". . . the proposed surety an opportunity of
pausing and considering, not only the nature of the obligation he
is undertaking but also its terms."'I5
In the United States as in England the courts have struggled
with the provisions of the statutes of frauds of the various states
and a formidable body of case law has developed. And just as in
the country of its origin, so the American courts have whittled
away much of the litteral meaning of the provisions of the statute.
While the basic purpose of the act-to secure defendants against
unfounded and fraudulent claims'--has never been obscure, the
courts have had almost insurmountable difficulties in devising a
simple and workable scheme of promises without and within the
statute.
Although American commentators, as strongly as their English colleagues, have emphasized the technicalities, incongruities
and conflicts in the decisions and the amount of useless labor
spent,' 7 a great deal of effort on this side of the Atlantic has been
expended in reducing the unwieldly body of law to a number of
12Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report, Statute of Frauds
and Doctrine of Consideration (1937) p. 11.
13Ibid. p. 33.
'4Ibid. p. 7.
p. 33.
'5Ibid.
6

' See 2 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 448, p. 1308.
'TSee particularly Willis, The Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism,
(1928) 3 Ind. L. J.427, 528. Professor Willis notes that the Century Digest,
the First Decennial, and the Second Decennial list under the heading of
"Statute of Frauds" approximately 10,800 cases of which less than one-third
held the statute applicable.
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rational propositions in accord with the "better views."' 8 Naturally,
the most important attempt of this kind are the propositions laid
down in the Restatement of Contracts by the American Law
Institute. 9
It can hardly be denied that the contracts to answer for the
"debts, defaults and miscarriages of another" are among the most
important promises involving the American statutes of frauds. In
this field, in addition to Professor Williston's endeavors,2 0 a lucid
essay from the pen of the late Judge Arant2 l helps to facilitate a
rational approach to the problems presented. It should also be noted
that the American Law Institute has dealt with the statute of
frauds in connection with contracts of guarantee not only in 'the
22
Restatement of Contracts but also in the Restatement of Security.
While absolute and complete consistency has been attempted,
nevertheless a few slight divergencet exist between them. The most
noteworthy discrepancy is occasioned by the fact that section 180
of the Restatement of Contracts is not reproduced in the Restate28
ment of Security.
The purpose of the following inquiry is, in the first place to
attempt a comprehensive and critical presentation of the Minnesota
rules governing the application of the statute of frauds to contracts
of suretyship as elaborated by the decisions of our Supreme Court;
and in the second place to ascertain how far they are in harmony
with the propositions laid down by the American Law Institute in
the Restatement of Security.
lsOutstanding, of course, is the work of Professor Williston.
19 Restatement, Contracts, secs. 178-225.
2oWilliston, op. cit. supra note 16, sec. 452.
21Arant, A Rationale for the Interpretation of the Statute of Frauds in
Suretyship Cases, (1927) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 716. The author points out that
"... the special danger in the type of situation contemplated by the statute
was due to the fact that the consideration usually alleged in support of a false
promise has always occurred and, whether induced by a promise of a deit was always consistent with the plaintiff's claim that it
fendant or not,
was." (p. 71 8 ).
-2Restatement, Security, secs. 89-100.
-3"Except as stated in secs. 182-184 and 187-189 a promise to perform or
otherwise satisfy all or part of a duty of any kind by which another person is
then bound or thereafter becomes bound to the promisee, is within Class II
of sec. 178 if the promisor by virtue of his contract or relation with such
other person is a surety for him, and the promisee knows or has reason to know
of the suretyship relation." This incorporates substantially Professor Williston's famous "surety test" (Williston, op. cit. supra note 16, sec. 462) which
was recently adopted by the New York Court of Appeals. Witschard Bros.
v. Brody & Sons, (1931) 257 N. Y. 97, 177 N. E. 385; Bulkley v. Shaw,
(1942) 289 N. Y. 133, 48 N. E. (2d) 398. However, all illustrations given
by the Restatement of Contracts to sec. 180 are incorporated into the Restatement of Security as illustrations to sec. 89, a reproduction of the usual
wording of the statute itself.
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II.
"COLLATERAL" AND "ORIGINAL"' PROMISES AND THE PROBLEM OF

CLASSIFICATION OF PROMISES WITHIN AND WITHOUT
THE STATUTE

The Evolution of ParticularCriteria for the Application of the
Statute to This Class of Cases.
Th

pertinent section of the Minnesota statute reads as

follows :24

"No action shall be maintained in either of the following cases
upon any agreement, unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing, and
subscribed by the party charged therewith: ...
(2) Every special promise to answer for the debt, default or
doings of another."
There has been no change in the wording of this section since
its adoption in the Revised Statutes of 1866.25 Previously the
Minnesota statute read slightly differently :26
"In the following cases, every agreement shall be void unless such
agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof expressing the
consideration, be in writing and subscribed by the part), charged
therewith: ...
(2) Every special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person."
This version was an unaltered copy of the corresponding New
York statute, which had been formulated in the Revision of 1829,?
while prior thereto New York had verbatim adopted section 4 of
the English statute.28
Not only was the New York statute the model for the Minnesota act, but the construction which the New York court had
originally placed upon its statute has had a deep influence on the
formation of Minnesota law. However, it should be emphasized at
the outset that the later far reaching changes of New York law 9
have had practically no repercussions in our state.
The New York law itself, of course, had not had an original
242 Minn.Stat. 1945, sec. 513.01.
Minnesota General Statutes (1886), chp. 41, sec. 6.
25

26Revised
Statutes of the Territory of Minnesota (1851), chp. 63, sec. 2.
2T
New York Revised Statutes (1829), Pt. II, chp. VII, sec. 2.
28
Laws of New York, Revised Laws of 1802, clp. 44, sec. 11; Laws of
New York, Revised Laws of 1813, chp. 44, sec. 11.
29See text and notes 41-43 infra.
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growth under the statute but was molded in agreement with English precedent. In particular it was in accord with the early English
practice of distinguishing "original" from "collateral" promises
in determining whether they were within or without the statute of
frauds. Yet the term "collateral" is not employed by the statute
and in fact was developed long before its enactment. The distinction was drawn by the courts originally for the purpose of
differentiating between cases where debt (or later indebitatus
assumpsit) and where an "action on the case stir assumpsit" would
lie. 31 Of particular importance in this respect were tile suretyshil
situations where only a principal was liable in debt or general
assumpsit while the surety had to be sued in special assumpsit.

2

Thus, it was only natural to continue the traditional terminology
and even to consider these cases turning on the proper form of
action as precedents for the application of the statute of frauds.33
But it should be added that it was early recognized ".

.

. that al-

though 'collateral promise' has become the technical phrase, whereby the promise within the statute has generally been distinguished
[it] cannot be taken as a certain criterion in deciding whether a
'3 4
promise for another is, or is not within the meaning of this law.
3
oSee, for instance, Roberts, Statute of Frauds (Phil. 1807) p. 207, who
calls his whole chapter "On Collateral Promises." This was in accord with
the usage by the courts. See Read v. Nash, (1751) 1 Wils. 305, 95 E. R.
632 where it is stated that "The true difference is between an original
promise and a collateral promise; the first is out of the statite, the latter
is not when it is to pay the debt of another which is already contracted."
The first case on this point is apparently the extremely important case of
Birkmyr v. Darnell, (1704) 1 Salk. 27, 91 E. R. 663, 6 Mod. 50, 87 E. R. 996,
Holt. K. B. 606, 90 E. R. 1235.
:31Ames. Lectures on Legal History (1913) p. 93; 2 Williston. Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 463.
:"-'See
for instance Rozer v. Rozer, (1681) 2 Vent. 36. 86 E. R. 293:
Butcher v. Andrews, (1698) 1 Salk. 23, 91 E.R. 22, Holt, K. B. 606. 90 E. 1<.
1234; Sands v.Trevilian. (1630) Cro. Car. 107. 193. 79 E. R. 695, 769:
M\.asters v. -Marriot, (1693) 3 Lev. 363, 83 E. R. 732, Holt. K. B. 26. 90
E. R. 912. Skin. 347, 90 E.R. 154. 12 Mod. 44, 88 E. R. 1154. But see Kent v.
Derby. (1678) 1 Vent. 311, 86 E. R. 200, 3 Keb. 756, 84 E. R. 994, which
is, however, considered overruled in Ames, Cases on Suretyship (1901)
p. 1, footnote 1. See also Ames. Lectures on Legal History (1913) p. 93; 2
Williston,
Contracts (rev. ed. 19.36) sec. 463. p. 1336 and note 3.
33
Ames. Lectures on Legal History (1913) p. 95. It may be added that
Justice Holt himself reported the case of Birkmyr v. Darnell, loc. cit.
supra note 30. which involved the Statute of Frauds, together with Butcher
v. Andrews. loc. cit. supra note 32, which turned on the form of action
point, under the common heading of "promises collateral," and that Salkeld,
in his report on the former case cited (1595) 1 Roll. Abr. 14 which reads
in translation: "If A buys goods from B and because B distrusts A's payment J. S. promises, that if A does not pay on such day he himself will
pay, and if J. S. dies and the vendors are not paid on the (lay, the executors
of J. S. can be charged in an action on the promise as it is collateral, 38
Eliz. 3B. R."
4Roberts, Statute of Frauds (Phil. 1807) p. 223.
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The truth of the matter is that the distinction between original and
collateral promises refers to a result rather than to a reason.
. The leading American case on the application of the statute
of frauds to cases of guarantees is the decision of Chancellor (then
C. J.) Kent in Leonardv. Vredenburg.3 5 It involved the validity of
a guarantee on a promissory note without explicit statement of the
consideration. The guarantor was held to be liable. In the course
of his opinion, the learned judge stated: "There are, then, three
distinct classes of cases on this subject which require to be discriminated;
1) Cases in which the guaranty or promise is collateral to the
principal contract but is made at the same time, and becomes as
essential ground of the credit given to the principal or direct
debtor. There, as we have already seen, is not nor need be, any
other consideration than that moving between the creditor and
original debtor.
2) Cases in which the collateral undertaking is subsequent to
the creation of the debt, and was not the inducement to it, though
the subsisting liability is the ground of the promise, without any
distinct and unconnected inducement. There must be some further
consideration shown.
3) A third class of cases ...is when the promise to pay the debt
of another arises out of some new and original consideration of
benefit or harm moving between the newly contracting parties.
The two first classes of cases are within the statutes of frauds,
but the last is not."
This classification was by no means a radical departure from
the English law as of that date, but a concise summary of the contemporary cases.30 The statement has been cited with approval
in many subsequent cases. And it is significant for this paper that
in the second case on the application of the statute of frauds to
contracts of guarantee that came before the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, Justice Flandrau repeated verbatim the statement from Leonard vp.Vredenburg quoted above and observed:

"I find no case that states the law upon this subject with more
clearness." 37
It is true that in the course of time courts and text writers have
35(1811)
36

8 Johns. (N.Y.) 29, 5 -Am. Dec. 317.
The English law of that date is thoroughly treated in Roberts, Statute
of Frauds (Phil. 1807).
.- 3Walker v. McDonald, (1861) 5 Minn. 455, 461.
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found fault with Kent's propositions. His third category, and particularly the words "new and original consideration of benefit or
harm moving between the newly contracting parties," has been
the target of the most bitter and somewhat unfounded attacks. Yet
in analyzing Kent's classes in their context and interrelation, it
appears that many of the objections are the result of a misconstruction placed on his real meaning rather than a basic difference
in views. 38 The New York court nearly a half a century later in a
case making Kent's language more precise stated that the historical
classification and the connecting remarks respecting each class
were strictly correct and had been a landmark of the law for forty
years.39 And thirty years after the Vredenburg Case Chief Justice
Shaw of Massachusetts, while observing that Kent's classes were
well stated, announced a somewhat more specific criterion than the
one based on the parties to the consideration which became later
known as the leading purpose test: "The terms original and collateral promise, though not used in the statute are convenient enough
to distinguish between the cases, where the direct and leading object
of the promise is to become the surety or guarantor of another's
debt, and those where, although the effect of the promise is to pay
the debt of another, yet the leading object of the undertaker is to
'40
subserve or promote some interest or purpose of his own."
However, in New York the aspect of the law has ultimately
undergone a fairly radical change since Kent's propositions. 41 In
1888 Justice Finch, reviewing the Vredenburg Case and three subsequent decisions summed the situation up as follows:
"These four cases, advancing by three distinct stages in a common direction have ended in establishing a doctrine in the courts
of the state which may be stated with approximate accuracy thus.
that where the primary debt subsists and was antecedently contracted, the promise to pay is original when it is founded on a new
consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him and
such that the promisor thereby comes under an independent duty
38
A typical example is Arant, Law of Suretyship and Guarantee (1931)
p. 107. Yet Arant, like other critics, overlooks the fact that Kent expressly
excluded the mere forebearance cases where no legal benefit results to the
promisor from that group. To Kent "consideration moving between the
parties" was not the equivalent of any "sufficient consideration," and he
specifically pointed this out. In the subsequent New York case which slightly
modified Kent's test by substituting "moving to the party making the
promise" for "moving between the newly contracting parties" it was pointed
out that the "difference is not one of principle." Mallory'v. Gillet, (1860)
21 N.55Y. 412.
Mallory v. Gillet, (1860) 21 N. Y. 412.
4ONelson v. Boynton, (1841) 3 Met. (Mass.) 396.
41(1941) 10 Ford. L. Rev. 439.
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of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor."' And in more recent days the court has moved even still further
away, considering the valid criterion now to be that proposed by
Professor Williston: "If as between them [the parties] the original debtor still ought to pay, the debt cannot be the promisor's
34
own and he is undertaking to answer for the debt of another."'
Although the final status of the law in a particular state can
only be ascertained upon a dose analysis of the course which the
stream of judicial decision has taken, it still seems permissible for
the purpose of a preliminary inquiry to start from Kent's classification and look at the time of the making of the promise whose
original or collateral nature is to be determined. Consequently the
Minnesota cases will be grouped under two main headings; 1)
cases where the promise in issue was made at the time the whole
transaction Was concluded, and 2) cases where the promise was
made in reference to a pre-existing debt of another person.
III.
CLASS I: PROMISES MADE CONCURRENTLY WITH OR PRIOR TO THE
CREATION OF THE DEBT

1.
Applicability of the Statute to This Class of Cases in General
The first group of cases to be discussed deals with the situations
where no debt exists at the time of the making of the promise. In
the usual circumstances of this type of transaction, a creditor
furnishes goods or services pursuant to negotiations with two or
more parties, one of whom obtains the delivery while the other
makes certain commitments as to payment. The problem naturally
is to decide under what conditions these undertakings have to
comply with the statute of frauds.
Since the statute by its very terms requires the obligation of
another, it is logical that it does not apply if the recipient of the
commodities is not liable but only the other party. The difficulty
is rather in determining whether the recipient did or did not incur
'2White v. Rintoul, (1888) 108 N. Y. 222, 227, 15 N. E. 318. The four
cases which Justice Finch summarizes were Leonard v. Irredenburg, (1811)
8 Johns. (N.Y.) 29, 5 Am. Dec. 317; Mallory v. Gillet, (1860) 21 N. Y.
412; Brown v. Weber, (1868) 38 N. Y. 187; and Ackdey v. Parmenter, (1885)
98 N.3 Y. 425, 50 Am. Rep. 693.
4 Witschard Bros. v. Brody & Sons, (1931) 257 N. Y. 97, 99, 177 N. E.
385; Buldey v. Shaw, (1942) 289 N. Y. 133, 138, 48 N. E. (2d) 398. The
quotation is verbatim from 2 Wiliston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) se. 475,
p. 1370.
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any liability. However, if the recipient is liable, it by no means
follows that the promise must be in writing. Then theoretically
three possibilities are open: 1) that both parties are joint or joint
and several obligors, 2) that the recipient is the principal and the
other party a mere guarantor, or 3) the rare occurrence where the
44
recipient is the guarantor and the other party the principal.
1) It is now recognized that the statute does not require that
there be a pre-existing debt, but that it may apply equally in cases
where one party guarantees a debt which the promisee contracts
on the very strength of the guarantee. In the middle of the eighteenth century there was a period in English law where this proposition was questioned. Lord Mansfield in M~awbrey v. Cunningha1,4
ruled that because the promise was made before the debt itself was
created it was not within the statute.46 However, a year later in
Jones v. Cooper47 Lord Mansfield himself, on the strength of a
ruling by Judge Nares, departed from his original view and recognized that the statute might apply ". . . where the undertaking is
before delivery and yet conditional." The court in fact held that
the promise in issue was of this type and required compliance with
the statute. This result was actually no innovation, but only a reassertion of the traditional views previously established. Thus. as
early as 1698 and again in 1704 it had been decided that an oral
promise of guarantee given prior to the creation of the principal
debt was within the statute. 48 The rule of Jones v. Cooper was subsequently reaffirmed by Lord Mansfield himself in Peckham v,.
FariaD and then established beyond question.
44
For an example, suppose that A goes with his fiancee B to a jewelry
store to buy an engagement ring. The young lady is known to the jeweler.
The ring being more expensive than A had anticipated, he finds himself
considerably short. B states that C should not worry, that she would see
that he gets paid. In this case B would seem to be both the recipient and
the surety. Minnesota has by dictum referred to this situation. See Cole v.
Hutchinson, (1886) 34 Minn. 410, 413, 26 N. W. 319.
45The decision is not separately reported, but the case was referred to
by Justice Buller in Matson v. Wharam, (1787) 2 T. R. 80, 100 E. R. 44.
and by counsel in Jones v. Cooper, (1774) 1 Cowp. 227, 98 E. R. 1058.
Lofft, 769, 98 E. R. 910. According to the information in these two cases, it
was decided by Lord Mansfield in nisi prius at Guildhall in 1773.
4GThis idea might have originated from a lonely dictum in Read v.
Nash, (1751) 1 Wils. 305, 95 E. R. 632.
47(1774) 1 Cowp. 227, 98 E. R. 1058, Lofft, 769, 98 E. R. 910.
48
Watkins v. Perkins, (1697) 1 Ld. Raym. 224, 91 E. R. 1046; Birkmyr
v. Darnell, loc. cit. supra note 30.
49(1781) 3 Doug. K. B. 13, 99 E. R. 514. Lord Mansfield stated: "Before
the case of Jones v. Cooper I thought there was a distinction between an
undertaking after credit given and an original undertaking to pay, and that
in the latter case the surety, being the object of confidence, was not within
the statute, but in Jones v. Cooper the court was of the opinion that whenever
a man is called upon only in second instance, he is within the statute."
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2) However, having settled that the statute was applicable to
concurrent promises, if collateral, the courts were confronted with
the more difficult task of distinguishing between original and
collateral promises in the various cases. Since the question is essentially one of attributing legal significance to negotiations, a twvofold
method of approach is possible: either the rather formalistic one
of classifying the terms used in the promise, or the more rational
one of determining the intentions of the parties in the light of the
surrounding circumstances-of which the form of the promise is
at best only one.
A.
The English Origin and Eary American Adoption of the
"Entire Credit" Test
The English courts, never adhering exclusively to a purely
literal approach, have from a very early date attempted to elaborate
certain practical standards, particularly the "entire credit" test.
The first case5" on this point decided under the statute (by Chief
Justice Holt in nisi prius) is apparently representative of the emphasis put on the words of the promise. "If A promise B being a
surgeon, that if B cure D of a wound he will see him paid; this is
only a promise to pay if D does not it ought to be in writing; but if
A promise, in such case, that he will be B's paymaster .

.

. he is

liable without writing." However, one year later the same judge
in Austen v. Baker,5 ' a case involving the proper form of action,5 stated that "... at Guildhal5 3 he always required the tradesman to
produce his books to see whom credit was given to."
50

Watldns v. Perkins, loc. cit. supra note 48.
51(1698) 12 Mod. 250, 88 E. R. 1299.
2
553 See text and notes 32 6.nd 33 supra.
1t is significant to note that the practice of ascertaining to whom
credit was given was originated by Chief Justice Holt when he sat at
Guidliall. This celebrated building was not only the seat of the Lord Mayor
and the city government of London but, what is more important, was also
the place where the merchants customarily settled their affairs and disputes.
See Thomas, Calendar of Select Pleas and Memoranda of the City of London (1932) Introduction. The Chief Justices of the King's Bench and
Common Pleas sat at Guildhall in nisi priuf hearings whereas the courts
in bumo held their sessions at Westminster. The close contact thus resulting
between the merchants and the Chief Justices would quite naturally affect
the decisions of the latter. We know that Lord Mansfield ". . . often declared
that he never passed his time more satisfactorily nor agreeably than in
trying mercantile causes by a special jury of merchants at Guildhall." 3
Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices (1874) p. 319. And Hale, as Chief
Baron of the Exchequer, ordered a search for precedents at Guildhall to
determine whether debt lay on the acceptance of a bill of exchange. Anonymous, (1668) Hard. 485, 145 E. R. 560. That the law merchant was quite
advanced in comparison with the common law even before that period had
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The next and leading case in point was Birkmyr v. Darndll.
Here the court announced the rule that "... if the whole credit
be not entirely given to the undertaker, so as no remedy lies against
the party upon the contract, but that the undertaker comes in aid
of the credit given by the contract to the party, the undertaking will
been emphasized by Malynes in his famous book, Lex Mercatoria, written
in 1636. However, since at that time the law merchant was troubled neither
by the requirement of writing nor the form of action, Malynes only distinguished cases of absolute or conditional suretyship for the purpose of determining whether a previous demand on the principal is required. Malynes, Lex
Mercatoria, (1636) pp. 68-69.
It is probably more than a mere historical coincidence that trials at
nisi pria were transferred to Guildhall on the eve of England's birth as a
great commercial power. This change was accomplished by the charter of
June 16, 1518 granted by Henry VIII to the City of London upon petition
of the Mayor and the citizenry. Birch, Historical Charters and Documents
of the City of London (1887) p. 97. Previous to that date the City had
jealously guarded its freedom from the presence of royal justices within
its limits and their interference in City matters. The itinerant judges sitting
at the Tower had run into severe troubles at the sessions in 1321 (1 Sharpe,
London and the Kingdom (1894) pp. 143 f.), and as a consequence the new
king, Edward III, granted the City a charter on March 6, 1327 in which it
was provided that all inquisitions regarding citizens of London by justices and
other officials of the King should be taken at St. Martin-le-Grande except
inquisitions by the itinerant justices at the Tower and sittings for gaol
delivery at Newgate. 1 Munimenta Guildhallae Londoniensis (ed. Riley
1859) p. 147, no. 205. St. Martin-le-Grande was technically not under the
jurisdiction of London, but a liberty of its own. In 1341 troubles broke out
again, when the itinerant justices attempted to hold court at the Tower and
Edward III was compelled to grant another charter on May 26, 1341.
1 Sharpe, op. cit. supra, pp. 187 ff. This charter reconfirmed that no justices
should be assigned to the City, except the itinerant justices at the Tower,
courts for gaol delivery at Newgate and the judges in error at St. Martin-leGrande. 1 Munimenta Guildhallae Londoniensis, op. cit. supra, p. 151, no.
247. The jurisdiction exercised at St. Martin-le-Grande was moved to
Guildhall by the above mentioned charter of Henry VIII which explicitly
left undisturbed the courts for gaol delivery and the sittings of itinerant
justices at the Tower. The latter exception was, however, practically without significance because the riots of 1341 marked the beginning of the end
for the jurisdiction in eyre. Cam, Studies in the Hundred Rolls, 6 Oxford
Studies in Social and Legal History (1921) p. 79. Further, there was no
longer need for them because their functions had been taken over by the
justices of assize which since 1285 had exercised the jurisdiction in nisi prius.
1 Holdsworth, History of English Law (5th ed. 1931) p. 272; Cam, o,. cit.
supra, p. 82. Thus, the justices of the King's Bench and Common Pleas from

1518 on held their sessions at Guildzall and no longer at St. Martin-le-Grande,
a conclusion borne out by numerous entries in the Patent Rolls before and
after 1518, and these sessions included the nisi prius sittings which gained
steadily in importance while the jurisdiction in error from the various
London courts declined. After the great fire of 1666 the Chief Justice of

the King's Bench sat in the Mayor's court room, while the Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas sat in the Court of Orhpans. 3 London and its Environs
Described (1761) p. 104. In the light of these recorded facts the statement

in (1814) 3 Campbell's Reports 42 that trials at nisi prius had been held in
Guildhall "by immemorial custom" seems exaggeraed.
54
Loc. cit. supra note 30. The defendant had promised to plaintiff who
was about to rent a horse to one J.S. that he would undertake that J.S.
should redeliver it safely.
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be within the statute." But it had trouble in determining whether
the whole credit was actually given to defendant. After a conference
with other judges, it was held per curiam that the promise was invalid inasmuch as under the facts detinue would lie against the
recipient. According to the court's view, the promise by the defendant that the other would redeliver a rented horse in connection
with a contract for hire was analagous to an undertaking that the
recipient shall pay in the case of a sale. And such a promise would
create a collateral duty whereas "I will see you paid" would give
55
rise to an original duty.
With the exception of one case which involved the construction
of a written promise, no decisions discussing the application of the
entire credit test in guarantee situations could be found for the
next sixty-nine years. A possible explanation for this hiatus might
lie in the fact that ". . . mercantile questions were so ignorantly
treated when they came into Westminster Hall, that they were
usually settled by private arbitration among the merchants themselves."5 6
The reappearance of this doctrine was somewhat hampered by
Lord Mansfield's vagaries referred to previously. Had Mawbrey
v. CionninghamP7 settled the law, no place would have remained
for the "entire credit" test. The decisions in Jones v. Cooper"8 and
59
Peckham v. Faria,
while restoring the law in respect to a possible
application of the statute of frauds to promises concomitant to the
main transaction, still avoided any specific foundation upon the
credit criterion. It should be observed, however, that the promises
in both cases were in terms dearly conditional. Apparently the
court felt that in such circumstances the problem to whom credit
was actually extended was of no or subordinate significance. Particularly Peckham v. Faria seems to be an extremely formalistic
60
ruling.
5
Tin regard to this latter statement, it should be observed that it is in
conflict with the holding in Watkins v. Perkins, op. cit. supra note 48, where
the same words were adjudicated to be indicative of a collateral promise.

563 Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices (1874) p. 275. The author refers to the period before Lord Mansfield's ascension to the bench in 1756.
5
7Loc. cit. supra note 45.
58
Loe. cit. supra note 45.
59Loc. cit. supra note 49.
60on the Jones Case it was at least expressly stated in the findings that the
recipient was entered as debtor in plaintiff's books. For that reason, counsel
in Peckham v. Faria tried to distinguish his case on that point, claiming
that his client had given credit to defendant, that this was an issue for the
jury, and that the jury had found it to be so. But the court nevertheless held
against the plaintiff, one of the judges (who had been of counsel in the older
case) pointing out that even in the Jones Case the recipient was known to
be insolvent.
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The credit test came back into its own in the cases of Matson v.
Wharam6l and particularly in Anderson v. Hayman,0 2 decided after
Lord Mansfield's resignation. The court very clearly considered
that the issue of to whom credit was given was decisive and set
aside a finding by the jury that credit was not partially given to the
recipient of the goods, since it resulted clearly from the evidence
that the opposite was true. Thus it became settled at that period
of English Law that the paramount issue in these cases was whether
the promise of the other merely aided the credit of the recipient
or whether it was the entire ground for the credit extended, that
it was a question of fact for the jury, and that the entry in tie
bobks of the plaintiff was an important factor to consider.
This state of English Law undoubtedly exerted a decisive influence upon the formation of the early American precedents.
Thus, the abovementioned leading opinion of Chief Justice Kent
in Leonard v. Vredenburg, after stating that "If the whole credit
is not given to the person who comes in to answer for another, his
undertaking is collateral," relies on Matson v. Wharam and Birk3
myr v. Darnell."
Similarly, in Cahill v. Bigelow,4 another American landmark, Chief Justice Shaw stated: "The test is this when
the promise is made before the credit is given, to decide whether
one promising is an original debtor or a guarantor, namely, whether
credit was given to the person receiving the goods. If it was then
such promisor is a guarantor only." His authorities are again exclusively the discussed English cases.
B.

Minnesota Law; First Stage

These two cases together with the English precedents themselves determined the evolution of the Minnesota doctrine as can
be ascertained from the decisions in Walker v. McDonald,1 Rogers
T,. Stevenson,66 Wilson Sewing Machine Co. v. Schnell," and par61(1787) 2 T. R. 80, 100 E. R. 44.
62(1789) 1 H. B1. 120. 126 E. R. 73. See also Keate v. Temple, (1797)

1 Bos. & P. 158, 126 E. R. 834, discussed at length in Roberts, Statute of
Frauds (Phil. 1807) p. 211.
63(1811) 8 Johns. (N.Y.) 29, 5 Am. Dec. 317. Kent was obviously also
influenced by the comments in Saunder's Reports following Forth v. Stanton,
(1669) 1 Saund. 210, 85 E. R. 217, 2 Keb. 465, 84 E. R. 292, 1 Lev. 262, 83
E. R. 398, which he cited in his opinion and which set the law forth very
succinctly.
64(1836) 18 Pick. (Mass.) 369.
65(1861) 5 Minn. 455.
66(1870) 16 Minn. 68.
G7(1873) 20 Minn. 40.
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ticularly Cole v. Hutchinson"s which must be regarded as the cornerstone of the law on that point in our jurisdiction.
In the Cole Case the defendant was sued on a promise to pay
for such goods as one J. D., who was not then present, would take.
The lower court instructed the jury "...
that to bring a promise
within the statute of frauds . . . there must be in existence at the

'time when the promise is made an original liability upon which the
collateral promise is founded." The supreme court reversed the
order refusing a new trial and pointed out that such a statement
of the law was a basic misconception of the true rule and apt to mislead the-jury. It avoided thus the error into which Lord Mansfield
and at least one early American case had fallen,69 but which the
Minnesota Supreme Court had clearly recognized from the begin70
ning.
In addition to settling the point beyond doubt that a pre-existing obligation by another was not required for the application of
the statute, Chief Justice Gilfillan's opinion constitutes an important
step in the development of the "entire credit" test in Minnesota.
This criterion had been invoked by our court from the beginning
in that type of case. Walker v. McDonald7 l started us out in complete harmony with the principles laid down in the previous section.
It dealt with the liability for rent of the tenant's son who had delared in connection with a lease renewal by his mother "If you
will let mother stay, I'll be responsible for the rent and see that
it is all right." The judge, quoting extensively from Leonard v.
Vredenburg, concluded that ".

..

there could be no pretense that

the house was leased defendant." The mother continued to be liable
for rent under the new lease, making defendant's promise necessarily a collateral one. Under the circumstances of the case, dealing
with the renewal of an existing relation, the soundness of the holding appears to be unquestionable.
In the next case 2 the credit test likewise was applied without
6s(1886) 34 Minn. 410, 26 N. W. 319.
69
Supra notes 45-49 and text. See Perley v. Spring, (1815) 12 Mass.
297; overruled semble by Tileston v. Nettleton, (1828) 6 Pick. (fass.) 509;
and Cahill v. Bigelow, (1836) 18 Pick. (Mass.) 369. In De Wolf v. Rabaud,
(1828) 1 Pet. (U.S.) 475, 499, Justice Story, spealdng for the court, intimated
that, were it not so well established in English law, a holding to the effect
that by the true intent of the statute it was to extend to cases where the
so-called collateral promise was part of an original agreement would deserve
"grave
deliberatidns"
70
Walker v. McDonald, (1861) 5 Minn. 455.'
7'Tbid.
72
Rogers v. Stevenson, (1870) 16 Minn. 68. It is, however, interesting
to note that the jury had found that the original credit had been given to
Stevenson. The supreme court, taldng the opposite view, nevertheless upheld
the lower court because an unenforceable promise was still sufficient consideration to sustain a valid endorsement.
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trouble. The plaintiff had sold goods to one Stone on the faith of
defendant's oral promise that if S did not pay for them he would.
In consequence of his promise he had subsequently indorsed Stone's
note. The court held him liable on the note although it recognized
that the underlying obligation was unenforceable under the statute,
since there was no doubt that the credit was given to Stone on the
faith of defendant's guarantee.
In Winslow v. Dakota Lumber Co.73 the court was for the first

time confronted with the issue of how in a doubtful situation the
question as to whom credit was given could be resolved. While the
statute of frauds is not explicitly mentioned in the opinion, it can
be inferred.that it was invoked, and the headnote to the case, prepared by the judge writing the opinion,74 so states. In his well reasoned treatment of the sufficiency and competency of the evidence,
Justice Berry commented on the fact that the business involved in
the action had been very loosely conducted and that therefore the
evidence admissible to prove a valid agreement between the parties
by necessity would encompass a large number of facts.
"When the informal character of the contract between the parties . . . is considered, it is clear that much more latitude was per-

missible for the purpose of showing historically and otherwise the
relations of the contracting parties, and the circumstances in which
they acted, than if the contract had been entered into with the
formality with which business of the kind ordinarily is and always
ought to be transacted."
The defendant had assigned as error particularly that plaintiff's
books of account had been admitted, although they showed that the
price of the goods sued for were charged to the recipient instead
of defendant, and that plaintiff consequently had adduced evidence
to show that this method of keeping account did not signify that
credit had been given to the recipient. The court decided that the
fact that the books did not charge the goods to defendant did not
make them inadmissible and that plaintiff had the right to introduce evidence ".

.

. to remove the presumption that the credit was

given to [the recipient] because the account was kept in his name."
The weight of such evidence upon the question of to whom credit
was.given bad to be determined by the jury.15
73(1884) 32 Minn. 237, 20 N. W. 145. The court apparently did not deem
it necessary
to look for support in precedents.
74
This is required by virtue of Minnesota General Statiltes (1878), chp.

63, sec.
75 4.
No authorities were cited in support of these views. But the decision
in the instant case has become a recognized precedent for the proposition
that a charge in the books to the recipient is only prima facie evidence that
credit has been extended to him. See, for example, Kamm v. Rees, (1910) 177
Fed. 14, 23; Note (1900) 53 L. R. A. 510, 538.
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Grant v. Wolf,7 6 decided in the next year by the same judge,
occasioned a further elaboration of the principles pertaining to the
construction of such dubious undertakings. Defendants had promised to plaintiffs "to see them paid" for boarding hands in the
employ of defendant's subcontractor. There was no evidence of an
agreement between the subcontractor or laborers and plaintiffs, and
the jury had found for plaintiffs. On appeal this finding was held
sustained by the evidence. The supreme court pointed out that the
promise was clearly original despite the form. "For, although ordinarily and standing alone, these words import a collateral agreement, yet like other words, they are to be construed with reference
to the connection in which they occur, and the facts accompanying
or surrounding their utterance."
However, the court further indicated that the result- might be
based also upon a second ground. The contractor had retained from
the estimafes earned by the subcontractor the price for the board
furnished to the laborers. Thus, intimated the court, this fact alone
might suffice to warrant a recovery, even though it were assumed
that the contract was with the laborers in the first instance, because these amounts were held by defendant pursuant to an implied
trust. This theory, which is no further discussed, is adopted by the
Restatements77 as a reason for withdrawing a promise from the
purview of the statute.
Against these four Minnesota cases as background we can now
appreciate Chief Justice Gilfillan's exposition in the aforementioned
case of Cole v. Hutchinson." The judge not only decided that the
instruction given to the jury was erroneous, but took occasion tocomment on the scope and the evidence necessary for the application
of the entire credit test. Curiously enough he refrained from citing
the precedents of his own court but quoted extensively from Cahill
v. Bigelow&9 to establish the rufe that to be an original promise the
entire credit must be given to the promisor. The justice added,
however, two important qualifications, one relating to the type of
credit, the other to its proof. The first is so important that we quote
in full :so
"The credit mentioned in stating the rule must be understood as
purchaser of the goods, for the receiver of the goods might by ex76(1885) 34 Mi.nn 32, 24 N. W. 289.
77

RestateMen

Contracts, sec. 182 (a); Restatement, Security, sec.

91 (a). Apparently this is the only case in Minnesota in support of this

proposition.
78(1886) 34 Minn. 410,26 N. W. 319.
79(1836) 18 Pick. (Mass.) 369."
8o(1886) 34 Min. 410,412,26 N. W. 319.
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press terms assume the liability of a guarantor. He might undertake to pay in case the other did not. But where both are liable,
whichever is original, primary debtor, the promise of the other
must of necessity be collateral. If the debt be a debt of the receiver
of the goods, then the promise of the other is to answer for his
debt, and is within the statute."
In regard to the proof of the credit, he pointed out that it was
controlled by what takes place between the parties when the goods
are called for or delivered. ". . . not by any mental reservation nor
secret motive on the part of either." Thus, in the instant case the
giving of notes for the price of the goods by the receiver would
apparently be conclusive on his liability as purchaser unless adequately explained: But the court cautioned that such circumstances
were different in evidentiary value from charging the price against
the receiver in the seller's books, or demanding payment from him or
bringing suit, which -were only akin to an admission and therefore
explainable as owing to mistake.
It can be seen that Cole v. Hutchinson and its predecessors
settled the principal rules governing the application of the statute
in the absence of a pre-existing main obligation. We shall set them
out in order that the further modifications to be noted may be more
easily followed:
1) The statute is applicable unless the recipient of the goods or
services receives no credit whatsoever, except possibly as a mere
guarantor;
2) The question as to whom and what kind of credit is given is
to be determined by the jury in the light of all circumstances surrounding the transaction, up to the reception of the goods and
services;
3) Acts by the parties subsequent to the transaction, such as
charging the price to a certain person, or demanding payment,
are competent evidence but should be treated in the nature of an
admission;
4) The form of the promise should be considered in the determination but is by no means controlling, although certain terms,
unless explained, might warrant a finding one way or the other;
5) The statute might not apply despite the fact that the recipient
is liable, if the promisor had received funds owed or owing to tile
recipient, for the purpose of paying the obligation;
The Restatement has not specifically taken care of any of these
points, except the one under 5). On the other hand, it has given
certain criteria of its own for the application of the statute, which
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we will discuss in connection with later cases involving these
principles.
C.
Minnesota Law: The Present State; Deviations From and
Modifications of the Entire Credit Test
Although the law in its present state is somewhat more complex, it may be helpful to arrange the discussion in the order of the
five propositions stated above insofar as possible.
1. The staticte is applicable unless the recipient of the goods or
services receives no credit whatsoever, except possibly as a mere
guarantor.The last six qualifying words of this first proposition,
injected into Minnesota law by Chief Justice Gilfillan, 0 2 appear
at first blush both reasonable and innocuous. But after close analysis they are apt to cause considerable difficult, and might even
have, at that juncture, changed the direction of the path of the law.
a) The qualification constitutes a serious erosion into the "entire credit" test because it recognizes that credit might have extended to both parties, the recipient and the promisor, and yet the
statute of frauds would not be applicable. It would be easy to say
that all that Justice Gilfillan actually did was to say that the nonrecipient promisor must have received the "principal credit" or
perhaps "credit as principal" instead of "entire credit"; yet in fact
the implications might go to the very root of the credit test. The
reason is that the actual or intended relations between recipient and
the other promisor might thus become a significant if not decisive
factor in the apjlication of the statute.8 ' In addition, if carelessly
applied they might give the seller an easy way to explain any credit
to the recipient and thus emasculate the whole statute.
On the other hand, the "entire credit" test in its traditional absolute scope probably overshoots the target and Chief Justice
Gilfillan's statement, if properly read and understood, may well be
regarded as a sound interpretation of the statute. The point has
never come up again before the Minnesota Supreme Court, yet in
the light of the quoted dictum it might well be accepted that Minnesota will not carry the entire credit test to its extreme.
b) In addition to the particular contingency referred to by
Justice Gilfillan in his limitation on the "entire credit" test, our
sOaSee quotation in text to note 80, supra.
stIt may also lead to the converse proposition, which is in effect closely
allied to Professor Williston's test, that the statute is not applicable unless
credit was given to the promisor (be he the recipient or other party) as
guarantor only.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

discussion must necessarily turn to another situation in which the
promisor does not receive the entire credit and yet the statute is
not applied. This is the case of joint promises. Since the problem
presents a great number of difficulties, a somewhat more general
discussion cannot be avoided.
Section 90 of the Restatement of Security recognizes that
joint promises are not within the statute. It provides:
Where promises of the same performance are made by two
persons for a consideration which inures to the benefit of only one
of them, the promise of the other is within the Statute of Fratids,
even if the promise is not in terms conditional on default by the
one to whose benefit the consideration inures unless
a)

The promises are in terms joint and not joint and several
or several; or
b) the promisee neither knows nor has reason to know that
the consideration does not inure to the benefit of both
promisors."
This provision was, with a slight change,8 2 incorporated directly
from section 181 of the Restatement of Contracts :83 consequently,
the reporter felt that no further explanatory notes were required.
The reporter for the Restatement of Contracts offered a brief
historical reason for the rule." "Though two obligations may arise
on the transfer of a single quid pro quo but one of them at common
law could be a debt." The other was therefore necessarily collateral.
The logical inconclusiveness of such analysis was properly realized
by the reporter, but the adopted rule was justified on the ground
that to hold otherwise "... would violate a rule dating back to the
early law of debt." The official comment by the American Law
Institute consequently states: "The debt being joint the debtors
stand for the purpose of the statute as a unit." 8 5
While the rule a) of the Restatement seems to be largely in
accord with the available authority on the point the reason given
for the rule by the cases is apparently quite different from the historical rationalization of Professor Williston"8 and the Restatements. It must be conceded that there has been little litigation on
the question, as evidently the attorneys did not press the point very
often. Thus the justice who wrote what is probably the leading
82

The Restatement of Contracts, sec. 181, reads that the consideration
does not inure to the benefit of "such other promisor" instead of "both
promisors."
83
Cf. Restatement, Security, sec. 90, comment a.
84
Restatement, Contracts, Reporter's Commentaries
85

No. 4, sec. 178.
Restatement, Contracts, sec. 181, comment a; Restatement, Security,
sec. 90, comment a.
802 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 466, p. 1342.
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opinion on the application of the statute to joint promises remarked:87 "The question of a joint promise appears to have been
seldom raised for adjudication in connection with the statute of
frauds."
The earliest instance in which the problem was posed is the
English case of Peckham v. Faria.s8 There counsel argued in support of a favorable verdict that the jury also may have thought
"... that the goods were delivered on the joint credit of defendant
and Sylva," Sylva having been the recipient of the goods. No
precedent was cited in support nor was the argument noted in the
opinion of the court. Roberts in his famous treatise of the statute
of frauds likewise did not refer to the subject.89 However, a book
on the subject by Walter W. Fell appearing in its second edition
in 188090 propounded the rule that a promise is not within the
statute where a party buys goods jointly with another though for
the sole use of such other.Y' The author assumed that tiffs was
clearly so if the vendor did not know that the bargain was entirely
for the use of one person only,92 but he questioned whether the
statute should also be inapplicable where the vendor knew that
neither a partnership nor a community of interest in the particular
transaction subsisted between the joint promisors. Nevertheless
he cited Scholes et al v. Hampson and Merriot, an unreported nisi
prius case, for the proposition that even such a transaction did not
come within the scope of the statute of frauds. 9' It can readily be
seen that this result was reached rather by a modification of the
credit test than by historical reminiscences on the action of debt.
While the earliest American case took an opposite view,05 the
SrGibbs v. Blanchard, (1867) 15 Mich. 292, 303.
88 (1781) 3 Doug. 13, 99 E. R. 514.
S9Roberts, Statute of Frauds (Phil. 1807).
9OFell, A Treatise on the Law of Mercantile Guaranties (2d ed. 1820).
9'Ibid.
p. 26.
92
Fell refers to Waugh v. Carver, (1793) 2 H. BI. 235, 126 E. R. 525
and the cases there cited as authority, but on e'amination it cannot be
said that they bear the author out. Waugh v. Carver deals only with the
liability of an apparent partnership without reference to the statute of frauds.
93
9

Op. cit.supra note 90, p. 27.

-ampson wanted to buy cotton from Scholes, but the latter requested
that someone else be answerable for payment. Merriot, a relative of Hampson
not otherwise interested in the business, then agreed that the invoices should
be made out in their joint names. Chambre, J., permitted in a joint suit
judgment against MNerriot, although he pleaded the statute, holding his
promise not to be within its scope. See Fell, op. cit. supra note 90, pp. 27-28.
95
Matthews and Alderson v. Milton, (1833) 4 Yerg. (Tenn.) 576. In
this case goods were advanced on the joint credit of one W. Milton and one

C. Milton, W. Milton being the recipient. The court held that V.and C.
could not be jointly charged because C. wvas not responsible without a
writing if W. was under any liability. This is, of course, the logical consequence of the entire credit test.
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trend of judicial authority shifted soon to a more restricted construction of the statute. A joint promise was first held to be outside of the scope of the statute of frauds in Wainwright v.Straw.
In that case a store was sold to the defendants upon their joint
responsibility on a cattle note. Upon the pleading of the statute
the court ruled:
"To bring a case within the statute of frauds it is necessary that
the undertaking should be collateral to, and in the aid of another.
But in the present instance the promise of the defendant is joint.
They both made the purchase, and upon their joint responsibility.
.. .The fact that it might have been for the individual use of
Straw is not sufficient to create the relation of principal aild
surety."
In the leading case of Hetfield v. Dow" the point was again discussed. Counsel had charged as error that the instructions had
not informed the jury that both might be original debtors, each
promising severally, for himself, to pay the debt. The court conceded that "If A and B jointly promise to pay for goods delivered
to B, A and B are joint original debtors: it is a joint promise to
pay the indebtedness of A and B and not a promise by A to pay
the debt of B. Such a promise is not within the statute." 8 But
the court refused to extend the exemption from the statute to
promises severally made by A and B to pay for goods delivered to
B because such a construction of the statute was precluded by
precedent. In a concurring opinion" 9 it was pointed out that no
evidence of a joint contract was submitted, and that the statute
always operated on one of two several promises for the same consideration. It is perhaps particularly noteworthy that the judge
emphasized in this connection (contra to Professor Williston's
celebrated surety-test) that "it by no means follows that he who,
by the arrangement between the promisors, ultimately niay be
bound to pay the debt is, as to the promisee, the principal debtor;
that does not concern him."
In the same year Chief Justice Shaw seems to have recognized
at least by implication that a joint promise need not comply with
the form required by the statute.100
The Michigan Supreme Court gave the matter extensive consideration in 1867.10 The court relied heavily on Hetfield v. Dow
9(1843) 15 Vt. 215.
97(1859) 27 N.J. L. 440.
98Ibid., p. 445.

99Ibid.,
p. 448.
0

1 oStone v. Walker, (1859) 13 Gray (Mass.) 613, 615.
lOlGibbs v. Blanchard, (1867) 15 Mich. 292.
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and held that "... the statute only applies to such promises made
in behalf or for the benefit of another as would, if valid create a
distinct and several liability of the party thus promising and not a
joint liability with the party in whose behalf it is made."'0 2 "In
all such cases where the sale is upon the joint credit and promise
of the defendant, though the property is purchased for and delivered to but one of them, I think the legal effect of the transaction
constitutes as between them and the vendor, a sale to the two
jointly."' 0 3 From the reasoning it seems to follow that the jointness of the credit rather than the technicality of the doctrine of
0 4
the quid pro quo was the ratio decidendi.
The few scattered cases later decided followed the course initiated by the decisions discussed in the text, *° some among them
relying in addition thereto on the certainly faulty ground, repudiated
:o12Ibid., p. 301.
103Ibid.,
p. 305.
' 0 4However, in a concurring opinion, Justice Campbell at page 305 states:
"I have had some doubt whether some of the rulings were not open to the
objection that they rest too much on the question of a joint obligation." This
argument was answered by the majority's reasoning that "... to say that
they can not both become jointly liable upon their joint promise, not in
writing, to pay such debt or the price of such goods, if the party originally
owing the debt or receiving the goods be at all liable, is but another form
of declaring that it is not competent for both to become original promisors,
as between them and the promisee, unless both are under an equal obligation
as between thenselves for the ultimate payment of the debt. Such a proposition, it seems to me, can not be maintained either upon principle or authority."
For later expressions to the same effect see Bryant v. Panter, (1919) 91
Ore. 686, 691, 178 Pac. 989; and White v. Carter Dry Goods Co., (1927) 221

Ky. 845,
851, 299 S. W. 1079.
05

1 Thorough research revealed only a very few cases actually holding
promises joint and therefore exempt. Boyce v. Murphy, (1883) 91 Ind. 1,
46 Am. Rep. 567; Oldenburg v. Dorsey, (1905) 102 Md. 172, 62 Pac. 576;
Whitehurst v. Padgett, (1911) 157 N. Car. 424, 73 S. E. 240; Olson V.
McQueen, (1912) 14 N. Dak. 212, 139 N. W. 522; Bryant v. Panter, (1919)
91 Ore. 686, 178 Pac. 989; White v. Carter Dry Goods Co., (1927) 221 Ky.
845, 299 S. W. 1079. More have indicated a willingness to exempt such
promises. See Eddy v. Davidson, (1869) 42 Vt. 55, 60; Welch v. Marvin,
(1877) 36 Mich. 59, 61; Rottman v. Fix, (1887) 25 Mo. App. 571, 573; Home
. People's Bank, (1891) 108 N. Car. 109, 119, 12 S. E. 840; Strickland v.
Hamlin, (1894) 87 Me. 81, 83, 32 At. 732; Williams v. Auten, (1901) 62
Neb. 832, 835, 93 N. W. 943; Baltimore Lumber Co. v. Israel Congregation, (1905) 100 Aid. 689, 691; Peele v. Powell, (1911) 156 N. Car. 553,
557, 73 S. E. 234, rev'd on other grounds (1912) 161 N. Car. 50. 76 S. E.
698; Symons v. Burton, (1925) 83 Ind. App. 631, 645, 149 N. E. 460:
Waldock v. First Nat'l Bank, (1914) 43 Okla. 348. 359-360, 143 Pac. 53:
Perry v. Jarman, (1916) 125 Ark. 240, 243, 188 S. W. 544; Masters v.
Bidler, (1921) 101 Ore. 322, 333, 198 Pac. 912. A very recent case has held
that, because a subsequent promise to pay a pre-existing debt amounted to
a novation creating a joint liability on the part of the promisor and the
original debtor, the promise was not within the statute. Doodlesack v.
Superfine Coal & Ice Corp., (1935) 292 Mass. 424. 198 N. E. 773. 101
A. L. R. 1247. For another case to the same effect see Ex Parte Lane, (1846)
1 De Gex Bnk. Rep. 300.
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since Lord Mansfield's days,"0 8 that a promise to be collateral maust
be auxiliary to a pre-existing liability.107
Thus, it seems to be well settled by authority that the statute
does not operate on joint promises even though the consideration is
received only by one of the promisors; the cases apparently neither
require, as the Restatements do, that the promises are in terms
joint nor give importance to the nature of the relations inter sese
between the promisors or to the knowledge of the promisee as to
whom the benefits inure. The criterion is rather: was credit extended to both of them in fact jointly.
However. the majority of the cases mentioned seem to rely decisively on the nature of the liability created as joint in the technical
common law sense. This leads to the problem of what the law is
in those jurisdictions where joint liabilities are by statute transformed in joint and several ones. Minnesota is one of them.10 8
Professor Williston expresses uncertainty on the point'0 9 and
reasons "If joint and several liability may be orally created, it
would be difficult to see why several liability may not." There is
practically no authority in this respect." 0 The only court ever to
expliditly comment on the question is North Dakota. It was argued
that the promisee who asserted his rights against one of the promisors could not claim exemption from the statute and "in one breath
to call the liability joint and joint and several." The court disposed
of this contention by saying"' "We do not deem this to be material. The question is not so much as to whether the liability was
a joint and several liability, but whether it was an original one." As
a matter of principle it can perhaps be said that the answer depends upon a choice between two alternatives. Either the promisee
will be deprived of an advantage resulting from a common law
technicality because his state has abolished a purely joint obligation, or the statute will be cut down even further, by construing
10076See supra note 49 and text.
1 Boyce v. Murphy, (1883) 91 Ind. 1, 6, 46 Am. Rep. 567; Olson v.
McQueen, (1912) 14 N. Dak. 212, 215, 139 N. W. 522.
1082 Minn. Stat. 1945, sec. 548.20 (passed as chapter 303 of the Laws
of 1897).
1092
Williston, Contracts (rev. ed. 1936) sec. 466, p. 1346.
"10 Apart from the North Dakota case cited supra, the only case which

refused the application of the statute to a joint and several liability is
Bryant v. Panter, loc. cit. supra note 104, but in the opinion the court
emphasized only the joint nature of the promise. All that can be cited on the
point in addition is the headnote to Home v. People's Bank, loc. cit. supra
note 105, and an instruction, which was uncalled for by the facts and for
that reason held erroneous, in Waldock v. First Nat'l Bank, loc. cit. supra
note 105.
"'Olson v. McQueen, (1912) 14 N. Dak. 212, 217, 139 N. W. 522.
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the exemption in case of "joint credit" to mean "credit as principals." The latter alternative would practically eliminate the statute
and certainly give the credit test a whimsical nature, except where it
is evident that the promisee had reason to believe that both promisors received the economic benefits of the contract-a qualification
which is substantially that of section 90 b) of the Restatement of
Security.
In only one instance, apparently, has the question of the exemption of joint promises from the operative scope of the statute of
frauds been presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Counsel
for plaintiff in Sdlnitt v. furray 12 attacked on appeal an instruction of the trial judge applying the "entire credit" test for the reason that "These charges absolutely prevented the jury from finding and determining in the case that the contract sued upon was a
joint contract between all of the defendants and the plaintiff; for
if it was a joint contract then plaintiff was entitled to recover."
Inasmuch as the Minnesota statute converting all joint obligations
into joint and several obligations 13 had been enacted five years
previously, the court might well have decided the issue of whether
a joint promisor could assert that his liability was now joint and
several and therefore invoke the protection of the statute of frauds.
However, with no discussion of the merits of counsel's argument
and without reference to the joint obligation statute, it ruled that
the objection should have been raised when the instructions were
given the jury.
It is therefore difficult to surmise which way the Supreme Court
of Minnesota would rule if the problem were ever to be presented
again. Certainly if the-promisee did not know that the consideration inured to one of the promisors only, the Restatement of
Security should have persuasive authority. Although there is little
precedent in support of the rule stated, it seems to be sound. But
where the promisee had notice that only one of the joint promisors
receives the contractual benefits, the existence of the joint and
several obligation statute produces a dilemma. On the one hand,
there are cases in other jurisdictions'1 4 which have admitted the
exception to the statute of frauds in case of joint obligations even
112(1902) 87 Minn. 250, 252, 91 N. AV. 1116.
'23Loc. cit. supra note 108. The statute in part provides that "...
all
parties to a joint obligation, including . . . all contracts upon which they
are jointly liable, shall be severally liable also for the full amount thereof."
114See Pope, Digdt of the Statutes of Arkansas, 1937, sec. 1284 and cf.

Perry v. Jarman, loc. cit. supra note 105; also Missouri Revised Statutes
Annotated, 1942, sec. 3340 and cf. Rottman v. Fix, loc. cit. supra note 105.
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though there were in force at that time provisions similar to our
joint obligation statute. But in none was the point called to the attention of the court. Probably more effective would be an argument based on Justice Gilfillan's express admission by way of dici
turn
" that if the promise of the recipient was only a guaraAce the
undertaking of the other promisor was an original one. It could
be reasoned from this that it should, as to the form of his promise,
make no difference whether the recipient promised as guarantor
or co-principal. However, on the other hand, it cannot be overlooked that the cases involving joint promises were decided on
their peculiar common law character which in Minnesota no longer
exists in its technical form and that the policy of the statute includes
a several obligation of the non-recipient if there is another several
principal who receives the actual benefits.
2) The question as to whom and what kind of credit is given
is to be determined by the jury in the light of all circumstances
surrounding the transaction up to the reception of the goods or
services. Very little change is noticed in the repetition of this
principle down the line of later cases."' And as long as a jurisdiction
maintains the "entire credit" test there is no possible way to circumvent this fact-finding procedure. It is imperative to find out
everything said or written between the parties, who was present,
why they were present, financial condition and credit standing of
the parties, amount, kind, and price of the goods or services bargained for, etc. Only in the light of these and many more facts
can a jury or judge correctly determine who was given the credit.
It is to be noted that the words and acts important in this inquiry are those which precede or concur with the consummation of
the transaction. The vendor's intent at this time is legally determinative as to whether the recipient or third party promisor is the
purchaser. And it is the objective manifestations of such intent,
not any "mental reservations or secret motive,'

1

"1 which are con-

trolling.
One act on the part of the plaintiff which has caused some
comment in suits against the third party promisor is the taking
of promissory notes from the recipient at the time of the sale. In
Cole v. Hutchinson, we have seen,"" it was said that such an act,
115Text to note 78 supra.

116See Schmitt v. Murray, (1902) 87 Minn. 250. 251, 91 N. W. 1116:
Bennett v. Thuet, (1906) 98 Minn. 497, 499-500. 108 N. W. 1; Collins v.
Joyce & Rasmussen. (1920) 146 Minn. 233, 235, 178 N. W. 503.
"--Cole
v. Hutchinson, (1886) 34 Minn. 410, 413. 26 N. W. 319.
8
1"
Text to note 78 supra.
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in the absence of adequate explanation, would be conclusive against
the defendant's liability. It seems difficult to imagine a situation
in which a vendor would take the recipient's note and still be
20
it was
giving him no credit. Yet in Armort v. Christofferson'
held that upon the vendor plaintiff's testimony that he took the
recipient's notes at the express direction of the defendant promisor,
and in reliance on his promise that he would also sign, the jury
could properly find for the plaintiff. "The explanation offered by
the plaintiff as to the taking of the note is such that it cannot be
said to have been conclusively shown that any credit was given to
Kieley [recipient]." It is obvious that while all acts are important,
some are weighted heavier than others. In the more recent cases,
there is little discussion of the test, the evidence, or the foregoing
precedent 20 indicating that the rules of law applied are correct and
the verdict is justifiable.
3) Acts by the partiessubsequent to the transactionare competent evidence but should be treated in the nature of an admission.
One of such acts which has received emphasis by both counsel and
court is the charging of the goods on plaintiff's books. It is reasonable to assume that the vendor will charge whomever he considers liable, and the importance of the plaintiff's act as evidence
of his intent was early recognized in the application of the "entire
credit" test.' 2' In Winslow v. Dakota Lumber Co. 122 the Minnesota
court, as we have already noted, 2 3 adopted a liberal view as to the
admissibility of such records by either party.
The problem which has been most troublesome in this connection arose when the vendor charged the recipient. The Winslow
Case indicates that under these circumstances a presumption arises
that the recipient was given some credit and it is incumbent on the
vendor to explain his actions. With a somewhat different approach, Justice Gilfillan in Cole v.Hutchinson' 4 took the view that
such entry is evidence like an admission against the vendor and
consequently can be refuted as due to a misapprehension. Whatever theory is adopted, it is clear from these and the later cases
that the book entry charging the recipient is not conclusive against
the plaintiff vendor. Thus in Maurin v. Fogelberg 5 the court
57 Minn. 234, 59 N. W. 304.
119(1894)
12 OSee North Central Publishing Co. v. Speranza, (1934) 193 Minn. 120.
258 N.
21 W. 22; Wolfson v. Kohn, (1941) 210 Minn. 12, 297 N. W. 109.
Text to and notes 51-53 supra.
222 (1884) 32 Minn. 237,20 N. W. 145.
2
' 3See text to note 75 supra.
124(1886) 34 Minn. 410, 26 N. W. 319.
125(1887) 37 Minn. 23, 32 N. XV. 858.
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through Mr. Justice Mitchell held that evidence tending to show
that the recipient was charged at the express request of the promisor was correctly admitted and properly submitted to the jury in
connection with the determination of who received the credit. The
opinion further elaborated the point and found a probable reason
for the promisor's request, that it would help the promisor keep
his accounts straight with the recipient. Again, in Culver v. Scott
and Wolston Lumber Co.1 -6 the same justice held to be a correct
statement of law an instruction to the effect that "The fact that on
plaintiff's books the articles are charged to Campbell [the recipient]
is a circumstance in the case that should be considered by the jury
in determining to whom credit was given." The last statement of
our court on the matter 12 7 merely reiterates the rule that plaintiff's
act of charging the recipient is not conclusive on the issue of
whether the recipient was in fact given any credit. In the Winslow,
Fogelberg, Culver, and Conrad cases the Supreme Court refused
to disturb a verdict in favor of plaintiff where he had in fact made
book entries charging the recipient. It is dear, of course, that a
charge to the defendant promisor, 128 as well as direct evidence by
the plaintiff to the effect that he gave full credit to the defendant1 2 1
is admissible to establish that the "entire credit" was given to him.
Another act in the nature of an admission which Justice Gilfillan
mentioned in the Cole Case was a demand by the plaintiff for the
recipient to pay for the goods or services before suit was brought
against the defendant promisor. The absence of proof of such a
demand was noted by Justice Mitchell in Maurin v. Fogelberg5 °
where a verdict for plaintiff was held sustained by the evidence.
226(1893) 53 Minn. 360, 55 N. W. 550.
127Conrad v. Clarke, (1909) 106 Minn. 430, 433, 119 N.

W. 214. 482.
In the later case of Askier v. Donnelly, (1923) 157 Minn. 502, 195 N. W.
494, the charge had been made to the recipient qualified by the words "Job
Donnelly [defendant promisor]." A per curiam opinion affirming a judgment
for defendant did not mention the effect given or to be given such words.
The respondent's appellate brief contains argument on these words in support of affirmance. For an, interesting disposal of a requested instruction
covering a similar issue by a lower court judge, see the Record, p. 1003
to Kenny Co. v. Home, (1935) 194 Minn. 357, 260 N. W. 358. The requested
instruction was: "The fact that on the plaintiff's books the insurance is
charged to [recipient] is evidence in the nature of admission by plaintiff
that credit was extended to [recipient] and not [defendant promisor]." The
judge's note says that such is proper for argument but he refused to give
the instruction because it would have unduly emphasized one specific item of
evidence.
128 See Lawson v. Walstad & Pearson Inv. Co., (1929) 177 Minn. 560.
561, 225 N. W. 725.
12fCollins v. Joyce & Rasmussen, (1920) 146 Minn. 233, 235, 178 N. "A'.
503.
"30(1887) 37 Minn. 23,32 N. W. 858.

SURETYSHIP-STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Obviously it is an important factor or circumstance in determining who got the credit. However, in Conrad v. Clarke",'it was
emphasized that ".. . the mere fact that she [plaintiff] ... made
efforts to collect from the corporation [recipient] is not conclusive
that she gave it credit in whole or in part."
In a relatively recent case " the action was commenced against
both the recipient Combs and a third party promisor, alleging a
sale to both. At the end of the plaintiff's case the action was dismissed as to Combs, the plaintiff claiming the goods were sold to
the defendant promisor upon his credit and delivered to Combs at
defendant's direction. The plaintiff's explanation was that Combs
had, been joined through error on the part of her first attorney,
that she neither authorized the action nor intended to sue Combs.
The lower court found .this statement to be true in fact, and the
supreme court, after holding that the evidence supported the finding, concluded that ". . . the fact that Combs was originally joined
as a defendant in the action would have no effect on the issues as
estoppel or otherwise."
Without exception, then, acts on the part of the plaintiff subsequent to the transaction which, standing alone, clearly indicate an
intent to hold the recipient in some measure liable have been dealt
with by our court as admissions or "prima facie" presumptions.
At the same time, evidence in explanation or refutation has been
freely allowed and fairly weighed.1 33 This approach would seem
necessary for consistency with the idea that the controling issue
of to whom credit was given is a question of fact to be determined
objectively from all the circumstances.
4) The form of the promise shozdd be considered in the determination but is by no means controling, although certain tcrns,
unless explained, might warrant a finding one way or the other.
The case of Grant v. Wolf,1 3 4 discussed above, held that a promise
in form collateral---"I will see you paid"--can be proven original
by appropriate evidence showing ". . . the facts accompanying or
surrounding its utterance." In Arniort v. Christoffersone3 the
promise was again "I will see you paid" and again it was held that
the words, ..... construed with reference to the connection in which
131(1909) 106 Minn. 430, 119 N. W. 214,482.
'32Kutina v. Combs, (1930) 180 Minn. 467, 231 N. W. 194.

233In one case, a second promise by the defendant to pay after the
services had been given to the third party recipient was held to be admissible,
not as an actionable promise, but as an admission of the contract previously
made. Collins v. Joyce & Rasmussen, (1920) 146 Minn. 233, 178 N. NV. 503.
'134See note 76 supra and text.
135 (1894) 57 Minn. 234, 59 N. W. 304.
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they were used, and the facts surrounding their. utterance," imported an original and not a collateral undertaking. The negative
implication of the Grant and Armart Cases was that in the absence
of such proof the collateral form would have been conclusive
against the plaintiff's case.
Such reasoning might have been in fact applied in Askier v.
Donnelly,13 a per curian memorandum opinion, where the alleged
promise "I will see that you get your pay" was declared to be
collateral. We are not told what, if any, evidence the plaintiff
introduced to explain the transaction in whole since the defendant
denied such promise and the trial court found that plaintiff had
failed to establish a contract. The court affirmed the order denying
a new trial and gave as an alternative reason that inasmuch as "The
language which plaintiff says was used did not recognize the debt
as defendant's own debt but as the debt of another," the promise
was therefore "within the provision of the statute of frauds." Because this technique indicates that the plaintiff in no way attempted
an explanation, the case fits nicely within the negative proposition
of the Grant and Armort Cases.
Only one case-3laurin z,.Fogelberg"7-has specifically dealt
with promises which are in form original. There, the defendant
had directed plaintiff to give two subcontractors all the goods they
wanted and promised "every first of the month you bring in the
bill, and I will pay it." The expression. said Mr. justice Mitchell.
"... uncontroled and unqualified by circumstances, imports on it,
face an original, and not a collateral promise, and implies that credit
was to be given exclusively to the promisor as purchaser." The
affirmance of the judgment for plaintiff indicates that defendant
had failed to explain away the form of promise which he had used.
Thus, in Minnesota the form of the promise, whether it be
original or collateral, has always been no more than a prima facie
presumption as to the intent of the promisor. Clearly no one call
contest the fairness nor logic of this approach when the words
used in the promise are provincial, vague or ambiguous. But what
of the case where the promise is so worded that there can be no
possible doubt as to the meaning? The Fogelberg Case indicates
that it makes no difference. However, in Cole v. Hutchinson33 the
court assumed the commitment "You sell to James D. whatever
goods he wants; and if he does not pay for them. I will" and ob136(1923) 157 Minn. 502, 195 N. W. 494.
137 (1887) 37 Minn. 23, 32 N. W. 858.
138(1886) 34 Minn. 410. 411, 26 N. W. 319.
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served that "The terms of such a promise would not contemplate
a sale to defendant, nor upon his credit as -purchaser and principal
debtor... None could doubt that such a promise would be collateral
and within the statute of frauds." From this language it might be
thought that in some instances the Alinnesota court will hold a
promise so certain in meaning that extrinsic evidence of an intent
can
contrary to the expression is inadmissible or to no avail. I.t
not be overlooked that such explanation could as easily support
the reasoning in Askier v. Donnelly as the theory advanced by the
writers above.
5) The statute inight not apply despite the fact that the recipient
is lidble if the promisor had retained funds owed or owing to the
recipient for the purpose of paying the obligation. This particular
basis for holding a promisor liable regardless of who received the
credit has never been resorted to after its original pronouncement
in Grant v. Wolf."'1 It can be assumed that this rule is still good
law and that Minnesota is in accord with the Restatement of
Security. 4
In addition to the above discussed decisions which constitute
fundamentally an application and elaboration of the entire credit
test, attention must he called to a few cases in which the court
apparently proceeded* along a different line of reasoning even
though the situation belonged to our class of "promises made concurrently with or prior to the creation of the debt." Here the court
considered as the decisive criterion for the original or collateral
nature of the promise whether or not the promisor's primary object or main purpose was to subserve some interest of his own.141
This is the familiar "main purpose" rule.
In the case of promises to pay a pre-existing debt, a more detailed discussion of which will be attempted in the next section, this
rule after a long history is fairly well crystalized. But where the
promise of the defendant has been prior to the creation of the debt
little authority can be found. The Restatements of Security and
Contracts provided for the "main purpose" rule only where the
promise is to pay a pre-existing debt.1 4 - A probable explanation is
139See
note 76 supra and text.
4
0oSee note 77 supra.
141(1924) 8 Minn. L. Rev. 629.
14-Restatement, Security, sec. 92 a).
.% . where the consideration for
a promise that all or part of a previously existing duty of a third person
to the promisee shall be satisfied is in fact or apparently desired by the
promisor for his own pecuniary or business advantage, rather than in order to
benefit the third person, the promise is not within the Statute of Frauds."
To the same effect see Restatement, Contracts, sec. 184.
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that in the application of the "entire credit" test evidence showing
that the promise was made primarily for the promisor's advantage
is used to determine the intent of the parties. It is another of the
"surrounding circumstances" which finally determines who was
given credit as purchaser.143 A further important inquiry is, would
it be practical to have the "main purpose" rule and the "entire
credit" test existing side by side in the law ? If both were to be
recognized a rather complicated procedure in each case would be
First the question
necessary-assuming appropriate evidence.
would be, did the promisor mainly subserve his own interest?
If yes, then the statute doesn't apply. If no, then the question as
to who was the purchaser in the light of all surrounding circumstances would have to be answered. Instructions to the jury would
be, to say the least, a bit complicated.
There are indications, however, that the Minnesota Supreme
Court will apply the "main purpose" rule in cases where there is
no pre-existing debt.

In King v. Franklin Lumber Co. 1 44 one K

was in contract with defendant to furnish him logs. K, unable to
obtain credit in order to supply the men working for him, was
told by defendant to get what supplies he needed and that defendant
would stand behind him. K went to the plaintiff and sought board
for his men which plaintiff agreed to furnish, relying solely on defendant's promise. In holding defendant's promise original, the
court talked only in terms of the interest which defendant had in
seeing the contract with K carried out14 5 and the improbability of

its being carried out in the absence of defendant's promise.
The next hint at the "main purpose" rule is found in Conrad v.
Clarke4 ' where the court, in affirming a judgment for plaintiff,
noted that "Defendant had interests to protect by a continuance of
the business of the corporation, and to further his interests and
protect them he urged plaintiff to continue in the work, with which
she was fully familiar." Plaintiff had stayed on with the corporation in reliance on defendant's promise to see her salary paid.
143See note 146 infra and text.
'44(1900) 80 Minn. 274,83 N. W. 170. The earlier case of Grant v. Wolf,
(1885) 34 Minn. 32, 24 N. W. 289, is cited for the "main purpose" rule in an
annotation in Note (1908) 15 L. N. S. 214, 223. Nothing in the case can
justify any conclusion other than that only the "entire credit" test was
applied.
245A simpler solution, perhaps, would have been to hold K an aqent for
defendant. In such a case the only question would be as to K's authority, real
or apparent, to bind defendant to this agreement.
146(1909) 106 Minn. 430, 433, 119 N. W. 214, 482, discussed in text to
note 131 supra.
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Standing alone the above quotation is an unadulterated application
of the "main purpose" rule. However, the statement was made
by the court in connection with a recounting of the various factors
which indicated the "entire credit", had been given defendant. It
is difficult to determine whether the defendant's interest is thus
-made one of the important "surrounding circumstances" in applying
the "entire credit" test or whether the court is merely saying that
because of defendant's interest his liability as sole purchaser of
plaintiff's services is certainly not unjust.
The most recent and also strongest case on the point is Kenney
Co., Inc. v. Horn .147 In this case appellant finance company held
chattel mortgages and conditional sales contracts on some taxi
cabs. Because the cabs could not be operated without liability
insurance, appellant took out covering policies from plaintiff. Suit
was brought for a balance of premiums due. The policies were
made out to the owners of the cabs who were joined in this suit.
Plaintiff recovered judgment against one of the owners and the
finance company, but only the latter appealed. One of the plaintiff's
theories, according to an instruction by the trial judge,21 was that
he would not have issued the policies if appellant had not promised
to pay the premiums. The Supreme Court's reasoning in affirming
the lower court was that inasmuch as the statute of frauds has no
application to "direct and primary obligations" it has no application
to appellant's promise because "It was for its [appellant's] benefit
that insurance be obtained upon the cabs so that they could be
operated and appellant receive their earnings to reduce the indebtedness secured by its chattel mortgage and conditional
sales contracts." The court declared it to be immaterial whether
appellant had an insurable interest. Because of the joinder of both
appellant-promisor and the owner named in the policy in a single
suit and because plaintiff obtained a judgment against both it is
obvious that the "entire credit" test was not and could have been
applied consistently with the result. And it is worth emphasizing
that the court apparently felt no difficulty in slipping over to the
"main purpose" rule.
From this discussion it seems to follow that quite probably
both the "main purpose" rule and the "entire credit" test are a
part of the law of Minnesota excluding promises made prior to the
creation of the debt from the purvie* of the statute of frauds. To
147(1935) 194 Minn. 357, 260 N. W. 358.
148 See the paper briefs to the case, Record, p. 329, folio 985.
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date there has been no conflict in their application. And it must
be conceded that the "main purpose" rule will cover many situations
to which the "entire credit" test is not applicable and which result
14
in injustice and hardship to a deserving plaintiff. 9
(To Be Continued)
4

' oAt least one case has arisen where the only basis for allowing recovery
was on the "joint promises" exception. See Bennington Lumber Co. v.
Attaway, (1916) 58 Okla. 229, 158 Pac. 566. In Minnesota, where, as we
have seen, this basis is probably non-existent, the "main purpose" rule could
adequately handle the situation.

